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T he present administration of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) came to power in 2012 when the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) elected a collective 
leadership with Jinping at the 
core, to use Party terminol-
ogy. Xi then established him-
self in a very short period of 
time as a strong leader, prob-
ably the strongest since Deng 
Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. 
Although the Xi administra-
tion has defined its political 
line as the “Four Compre-
hensives”, Xi is best known 
for his call for the realisation 
of the “China dream” (中国梦 
Zhōngguó mèng). 
The four-pronged strategy 
consists of comprehensively 
building a moderately pros-
perous society, comprehen-
sively deepening reform, 
comprehensively governing 
the nation according to law 
and comprehensively gov-
erning the Party according to 
strict rules. The first two items 
are a legacy of the Deng and 
Jiang Zemin administrations, 
the third and fourth began under Hu Jintao but the fourth has 
taken on special meaning under Xi. 
The China Dream is a more 
ambiguous concept. It 
does not correspond to the 
“American Dream” which 
could seem to be a model 
for the term. The American 
Dream implies that any in-
dividual can achieve his or 
her own individual dream 
by his or her own individual 
efforts. The China Dream 
would seem to subordinate 
individual dreams to the col-
lective dream of “the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation”, in Xi’s words, to 
realizing a prosperous and 
strong country, the rejuve-
nation of the nation and the 
well-being of the people. 
The great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation has been a 
rallying cry since the mid-19-
th century when the superior 
economic and military pow-
er of the Western imperialist 
nations inflicted successive 
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Xi then established himself in a very short period of time as a 
strong leader, probably the strongest since Deng Xiaoping and 
Mao Zedong.
The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that Xi calls for is 
a strongly nationalist boost for continued economic growth and 
the consolidation of geopolitical power –to restore China to its 
former preeminent place in the world order.
In the recent past “efficiency” and “equity” had served to des-
cribe two rival “lines” within the CPC. The “liberal” line was 
said to promote a liberalisation of the market in order to create 
wealth. The “new left” decried the growing inequality between 
haves and have-nots and called for social justice in the distribu-
tion of wealth. 
For Deng Xiaoping it was impossible to redistribute a wealth 
that did not exist, prioritising the creation of wealth. In front of 
growing inequality and social unrest, Hu Jintao prioritised the 
creation of a “harmonious society”.
In order to better understand the innovations under way we 
need to develop a better understanding of the issues, the poli-
cies, the paradigms and the discourse that are being constructed.
MAO’S PLACE IN XI’S “CHINA DREAM”
Sean Golden, Director East Asian Studies & Research Centre, Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona. Associate Senior Researcher, CIDOB
2 notes internacionals CIDOB 130 . OCTOBER 2015 notes internacionals CIDOB 130 . OCTOBER 2015
defeats and loss of sovereignty on the Chinese empire. Chi-
na’s defeat at the hands of societies that had defined moder-
nity as the accumulation of wealth and power subverted the 
traditional Chinese worldview of moral and cultural superi-
ority as the basis of power, provoking a crisis of introspection 
and theorising that continues to this day. According to Angus 
Maddison (2007), in 1820 China represented more than 30% 
of the world GDP to less than 25% for Western Europe and 
the US. By 1949 China was down to less than 5% while the US 
and Western Europe had doubled to more than 50%. Today 
China accounts for some 16% of the world GDP, still less than 
half of its share in 1820, while the European Union and the 
US still share some 40% of world GDP. The great rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation that Xi calls for is a strongly nationalist 
boost for continued economic growth and the consolidation 
of geopolitical power –to restore China to its former preemi-
nent place in the world order. Doing so in the context of a 
huge population in a still-developing country requires effi-
cient government. This is the CPC’s “leading role”, but the 
context of the PRC keeps changing and the CPC must evolve 
to adapt to the changes if it wants to conserve that role. 
On 9 September 2015 in a meeting with foreign experts that I 
attended in Beijing as part of The Party and the World Dialogue 
2015 under the heading To Discipline the Party; Responsibility 
of the Party, Wang Qisan, a leading member of the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the 
CPC and Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection, stated quite clearly that the major task facing the 
CPC today under these changing circumstances is the correct 
and competent understanding and carrying out of its role as 
a “long-term ruling party” in maintaining an equilibrium 
between the efficient production of wealth and its equitable 
distribution. There are two important concepts at stake here. 
The first is the meaning of “ruling party”. The second is the 
growing imbalance between “efficiency” and “equity”. 
Both “ruling party” or “governing party” can be translated into 
Chinese by the same term (执政党 zhízhèngdǎng) but they are 
not really synonymous. When foreign experts suggest that the 
use of “ruling party” has pejorative connotations in English, 
CPC experts often reply that the use of “governing party” as an 
alternative translation could imply the existence of an opposi-
tion that might come to power, a possibility that they reject be-
cause “history and the people” have made the CPC the ruling 
party, an argument used by Wang Qisan to justify the CPC’s 
role in running the country. It can be difficult for an observer 
accustomed to the alternation in power of liberal democracies 
to understand the logic of this affirmation. In the context of 
Chinese history, however, it has echoes of the traditional con-
cept of 天命 tiānmìng (the “mandate of Heaven”), the ancient 
political theory that a cosmic force (天 tiān, the sky) bestowed 
the mandate to rule on a royal house that would govern in fa-
vour of the common good and maintain peace and stability. If 
that royal house failed to fulfil its duties, 天 tiān would with-
draw its mandate and transfer it to a different royal house ca-
pable of restoring order and stability. This concept, developed 
more than 3,000 years ago, explained and justified the fall and 
rise of dynasties. Disorder and instability were symptoms of a 
decadent regime. Victory in the overthrow of that regime was 
a symptom of merit, of having received the cosmic mandate to 
rule. By analogy, the CPC’s victory in 1949 established its man-
date and its legitimacy to be a long-term ruling party, to be the 
ruling party of China. As a corollary, the CPC’s ability to main-
tain social stability and manage economic growth confirms its 
mandate to rule. By the same token, corruption, misrule and 
instability would put its mandate in doubt. 
At the same time, “history” in this context could take on over-
tones of “historical materialism”. The belief that Karl Marx’s 
theories were “scientific” made them especially attractive 
to modernisation movements in developing countries that 
lacked capitalists. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx devel-
oped “laws” of society, analogous to the “laws of nature”: the 
law of supply and demand, the law of diminishing returns, 
historical and dialectical materialism, base and superstruc-
ture. Smith’s laws were amenable to societies with capital-
ists. Marx’s laws seemed more amenable to societies without. 
In both cases, the confidence given by the universality of the 
laws of nature as demonstrated by the modern scientific and 
industrial revolutions, lead people to believe that the appli-
cation of Smith’s or Marx’s laws to society should produce 
the desired outcome. Even though this has not been the case, 
belief in their certainty still 
persists in many quarters. 
In the case of Smithism, it 
persists in modernisation 
theories and the Washing-
ton Consensus. In the case of 
Marxism, and in the context 
of China, it persists in the theory of “scientific outlook on de-
velopment” associated with the administration of Hú Jǐntāo.
In the recent past “efficiency” and “equity” had served to de-
scribe two rival “lines” within the CPC. The “liberal” line was 
said to promote a liberalisation of the market in order to create 
wealth. The “new left” decried the growing inequality between 
haves and have-nots and called for social justice in the distribu-
tion of wealth. Deng Xiaoping said it was impossible to redistrib-
ute a wealth that did not exist, prioritising the creation of wealth. 
In the face of growing inequality and social unrest, Hu Jintao 
prioritised the creation of a “harmonious society”. The fact that 
Wang Qisan used both terms together might seem to indicate 
a consensus on the problems facing the next phase of China’s 
development. According to Wang, while the primary task of the 
Party was to guarantee food and housing for everyone, there 
was a general consensus on priorities. Once everyone’s access 
to food and housing had been guaranteed, however, this gen-
eral consensus broke down as a result of the explosion of rising 
expectations created by the success of the preceding phase. The 
problem now becomes one of mediating a plurality of diverse 
and often incompatible demands and interest groups. Thus the 
need to build a moderately prosperous society, deepen reform, 
govern the nation according to law and govern the Party accord-
ing to strict rules “comprehensively”, that is to say, taking all 
factors into consideration and subjecting all developments to a 
comprehensive “scientific outlook on development”.
The China Dream seems to subordinate individual dreams to 
the collective dream of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation”.
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The transition from 30 years of radical “Maoism” based on 
class struggle, the dictatorship of the masses and the identi-
fication of “contradictions” gave way to 30 years of Dengism 
based on reform and opening up. This evolution also repre-
sents the transition of the CPC from being a revolutionary 
party to being a governing party. A new phase has now be-
gun taking form and this new phase is still developing new 
theoretical frameworks and a new standard discourse. In 
this new discourse references to ancient Confucian texts rub 
shoulders with Maoist slogans and slang from the Internet. 
The heterogeneity of this new discourse is a symptom of its 
transitional nature. These are the contexts in which we need 
to analyse Mao’s place in Xi’s dream. One source of confu-
sion in this process of analysis is the fact that old established 
slogans and keywords are being given new meanings. Un-
less we learn and understand these new meanings we could 
misinterpret what is being said.
The figure of Mao Zedong casts a shadow over the whole 
process. In 1981 the Party said he had been right 70% of the 
time but erred 30%. The new Party line promoted by Xi Jin-
ping says that the first 30 years of Maoism cannot be judged in 
the light of the subsequent 30 years of Dengism, nor vice ver-
sa. Mao’s years were characterised by class struggle. Deng’s 
years substituted the production of wealth for class struggle. 
For Mao, the most important “contradiction” was that be-
tween classes. For Deng it was the contradiction between the 
legitimate desire of the people to improve their livelihood 
and the failure of the pro-
ductive forces to facilitate 
this. Deng resuscitated the 
phrase “moderately pros-
perous society” (a middle in-
come country by World Bank 
standards) from a classical 
Confucian text. Xi frequently 
quotes classical texts and has 
given a reading list of classi-
cal texts to Party members. Deng Xiaoping quoted Mao to 
justify many of his reforms but Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
avoided what has been called the “Mao stain”. The trauma of 
the Cultural Revolution cast “governing according to Mao” 
in a very negative light. 
Mao had once famously said to Edgar Snow “I am a monk 
using a parasol”. Monks shaved their heads. Parasols block 
out the sky. Mao was alluding to a proverbial play on words. 
A monk using a parasol has “no hair no sky”. The word 
“hair” is pronounced the same way as the word for “law”. 
The word for “sky” also refers to the cosmic power men-
tioned above in relation to the mandate of heaven. Mao was 
saying he was subject neither to human nor cosmic law. This 
would be an example of 人治 rénzhì “one-man rule” or per-
sonalised rule” -Obrigkeitsstaat in German- as opposed to 法
治 fǎzhì “rule-based governance” -Rechtsstaat in German. The 
use of the German terms helps to point out one of the dif-
ficulties involved in understanding the new discourse under 
construction in China. In English the term 法治 fǎzhì is usu-
ally translated as “rule of law” although there is some debate 
over whether it should be translated as “rule by law” (the of-
ficial Chinese choice is “law-based governance”). If we take 
the English language translation and its ensuing debate as 
the basis for discussing the Chinese concept we could miss 
the point. The English language term “rule of law” is not eas-
ily translated into European languages either, let alone Chi-
nese.1 The European terms are Rechtsstaat, État de droit, Estado 
de Derecho, a state administration based on laws. They are not 
strictly speaking equivalents of the English “rule of law”, a 
term that implies a universal and absolute law superior to 
everything else that everyone is subject to. Nor is the Chinese 
term. The continental European terms and the Chinese term 
refer to the use of laws to govern as opposed to arbitrary or 
capricious decision-making. The transition away from “gov-
erning the country like Mao” to “governing the country by 
rules” is part of the transition from being a revolutionary 
party to being a governing party.
At the same time the growing disparity between haves and 
have-nots has revived a nostalgia for Maoist egalitarianism 
and idealism. The Maoist discourse is well known to Chinese 
people. The disgraced leader Bó Xīlái tried to revive Maoist 
songs and slogans in his “sing red strike black” campaign to 
mobilise the people through Maoist nostalgia (singing Maoist 
songs) in order to strike back at organised crime and special 
(“black”) interests. His attempted revival of Mao sent shivers 
through the body politic that had suffered the excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution and his policies were stopped. Yet Xi Jin-
ping has also revived aspects of the Maoist discourse, raising 
doubts among China-watchers about possible changes in the 
Dengist reform policies or a possible return to Maoist poli-
cies. It is in this context that we need to understand that the 
construction of a new political paradigm and its concomitant 
discourse is giving new meanings to traditional terms. In the 
case of Confucian terminology, Deng’s use of “moderately 
prosperous society” is an example. The Party is referring to 
World Bank definitions of low, middle and high income coun-
tries when it calls for a “moderately prosperous society”, not 
to classical Confucian concepts, even though the term comes 
from a Confucian text. Another example that startles China 
experts is the revival of “the Fengqiao experience”. In 1962 
Mao renewed his call for “class struggle” in a plenary session 
of the CPC that purged Xi Zhòngxūn, the father of Xi Jinping. 
In 1963 Mao launched the “socialist education movement”, a 
movement seemingly aimed at confirming Party members’ 
understanding of Party policy. This movement would evolve 
into the Cultural Revolution. The same year Mao praised the 
way in which class struggle was being carried out at the grass 
roots level, citing the Fengqiao District in China’s southeast 
as an example. This would become known as “the Fengqiao 
1. I would like to thank Prof. Frank Pieke of Leiden University for calling my attention to 
this detail.
In the context of Chinese history, disorder and instability 
were symptoms of a decadent regime. By the same token, 
corruption, misrule and instability would put CPC’s mandate 
in doubt.
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experience” and it referred to the identification and punish-
ment of class “enemies” at the local level without having to 
involve upper echelons of power, leading to some of the most 
notorious aspects of the Cultural Revolution. 
The term has been revived under Xi Jinping but it no longer 
has the same meaning because the context has changed and 
because class struggle is no longer the basis of the Party’s 
actions. Some refer to this revival of Maoist discourse as 
Maoism 2.0 and to the campaign against corruption in the 
Party ranks as Cultural Revolution 2.0 but there are signifi-
cant differences. The first Socialist Education Movement 
went beyond the ranks of the Party to carry class struggle 
to the population at large. The current anti-corruption and 
education policy applies to the ranks of the Party and has not 
spilled over into a general persecution. The “new Fengqiao 
experience” refers to the work of Party cadres at the local 
level, where the real interface between the Party and the peo-
ple occurs. It refers to solving problems and complaints at 
the local level before they spin out of control into large-scale 
social unrest. It refers to the role of what Xi has called his 
“key minority”, the local officials (Lu, 2015). In this context, 
the anticorruption process being directed by Wang Qisan 
is an attempt to assure the people at the local level that the 
Party is trustworthy and it is also an attempt to educate Party 
members in both policy and discipline. In that sense it might 
be compared to the earlier Socialist Education Movement in-
stigated by Mao Zedong in order to destroy his opponents 
inside the Party, but not as Mao intended it to be. In 1963 
Party leaders like Liú Shàoqí (who would be killed during 
the Cultural Revolution) and Deng Xiaoping (who would be 
purged) tried to restrict the application of the Movement to 
Party members. So far today it has been restricted to Party 
members. The anti-corruption policy of the Xi administra-
tion has been interpreted by some foreign observers to be a 
means of consolidating control within the Party and purg-
ing enemies. That might be the case if what were happening 
was an anti-corruption “campaign” that might come to an 
end, but there are reasons to believe that it may in fact be a 
long-term “policy” and not just a “campaign”. Xi’s recovery 
of some of the Maoist discourse has been seen as a strategy 
to ward off “traditionalist” or “hard-line” critics within the 
CPC, but there is no evidence of retrocession in the policy of 
reform and opening up. Perhaps Xi is “talking the Mao talk” 
but “walking the Deng walk”.
“In China, due to the Chinese propensity to rely on history 
for support, new changes often appear in the guise of old his-
tory. The Chinese employ old terminology to explicate new 
knowledge, pouring new wine into old bottles. They seem to 
be forever performing in an age old drama entitled “resto-
ration”. In reality, though, their “historical memory” is just 
leading China’s intellectual world to the expression of hith-
erto unknown orientations and attitudes through its connec-
tion to new intellectual resources.” (Ge, 2014)
In the new discourse references to ancient Confucian texts 
rub shoulders with Maoist slogans and slang from the 
Internet.
The transition from a revolutionary to a governing party takes 
place in the context of Mao’s definition of “New Democracy” 
or the “New Democratic Revolution”. Put simply, the “old” 
democracy and the “old” democratic revolution had been 
organised by and on behalf of the bourgeoisie, a privileged 
minority distinct from the rest of “the people”. The “new” 
democracy was to be organised by and on behalf of the rest 
of “the people”. This argument served to justify the dictator-
ship of the masses, and continues to serve as a justification for 
the CPC role as a long-term ruling party. The transition from 
revolutionary to ruling Party is a controlled process. In 1979 
Deng Xiaping set the limits of debate about the political struc-
ture with his four “cardinal” principles: upholding the so-
cialist path, upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, 
upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), and upholding Mao Zedong Thought (and Marxism-
Leninism. Today the fourth principle has been expanded to in-
clude Deng Xiaoping Theory, the theory of “three represents”, 
the “Scientific Outlook on Development” and “the spirit of 
the series of important speeches by General Secretary Xi Jin-
ping”. It is worth noting that in this updated list the names of 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao do not appear, even though they 
were associated respectively with the three represents and 
scientific development, but the name of Xi does appear, in ad-
dition to the names of Mao and Deng.
The changing circumstances of the PRC and the multiplica-
tion and disparity of problems that the government faces 
have led to calls for innova-
tion in the realm of science 
and technology and in the 
realms of political order. The 
English language versions 
of official documents of the 
Party utilised by the govern-
ment refer to “independent innovation”. This is an intrigu-
ing possibility because it might seem that the Party was en-
couraging independent thinking. The Chinese term is 自主創
新 zìzhǔ chuàngxīn, and 自主 zìzhǔ could also be translated as 
“indigenous” or “self-sufficient”. It is possible that the term 
refers to a form of innovation with Chinese characteristics, 
or a form of innovation that would free China from depend-
ence on foreign innovation, connotations that are not quite 
the same as autonomous independent innovation. One way 
or the other, China is innovating as it approaches the “two 
centenaries” that have become the target dates for resolving 
the problems and issues of the next 30 year phase of Chinese 
modernisation: the centenary of the founding of the CPC in 
1921 and the centenary of the founding of the PRC in 1949. 
In order to better understand the innovations under way 
we need to develop a better understanding of the issues, the 
policies, the paradigms and the discourse that are being con-
structed. This requires better knowledge of the Chinese lan-
guage and culture and first-hand knowledge of the policies 
being carried out. It also requires more collaborative efforts 
to promote and build better mutual and common knowledge 
and understanding, perhaps along the lines of the Europe-
China Cultural Compassor the Dictionary of Untranslatables 
(Cassin, 2014). Mutual respect requires mutual knowledge in 
order to construct a common and consensual multicultural 
civic discourse that could lead to meaningful cooperation.
notes internacionals CIDOB 130 . OCTOBER 2015 5notes internacionals CIDOB 130 . OCTOBER 2015
Bibliographic References
Cassin, Barbara; Apter, Emily; Lezra, Jacques; Wood, Michael. 
Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon. Princeton 
University Press, 2014.
Cassin, Barbara (ed.). Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: dic-
tionnaire des intraduisibles, Paris: Le Seuil/Le Robert, 2004.
Ge, Zhaoguang. An Intellectual History of China. Volume One. 
Knowledge, Thought and Belief before the Seventh Century CE. 
Trans. Michael S. Duke & Josephine Chiu-Duke. Leiden, Bos-
ton: Brill. 2014, pp. 40-41.
Lu, Yiyi. “Understanding Xi Jinping’s ‘Key Minor-
ity’”, China Real Time (7/21/15). http://blogs.wsj.com/
chinarealtime/2015/07/21/understanding-xi-jinpings-key-
minority/
Maddison, Angus. Contours of the World Economy 1-2030 AD. Es-
says in Macro-Economic History. Oxford University Press, 2007.
Bibliography
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: from prehuman 
times to the French revolution. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux. 2011.
Old established slogans and keywords are being given 
new meanings. Unless we learn and understand these new 
meanings we could misinterpret what is being said.
